Political analysts and columnists critical of U.S. policy in Iraq are quick to point out that the recent elections are irrelevant if there is no stability. The insurgency and its efforts to challenge the legitimacy of the new government, the pundits say, reduce the elections to a PR opportunity for the Bush administration.

While I agree that elections don’t mean instant success, I think focusing on the insurgency is shortsighted. Regardless of the inherent violence in any stabilization effort, I question this new government’s ability to forge a cohesive, democratic Iraq in the long run.

An example of the diverse and challenging cultural and ideological climate of the new Iraq even can be seen in the insurgency – an entity that many would have you believe is a unified onslaught that will defy order indefinitely.

The Iraqi insurgency is comprised of Baathists, terrorists now allied with Al-Qaeda, various extremist groups and miscellaneous rebels and thugs. It is a group galvanized by its burning hatred for the United States and nothing more.

The Baathists hate America because it removed them from power. The terrorists and other religious extremists hate America for the cultural implications of becoming westernized. And still other groups have simply enjoyed exploiting the anarchy following the invasion. None of these groups have any interest in cooperating other than in opposition to the United States – the insurgency is, therefore, a peripheral threat to democracy in the long run.

The real threat is the cultural and ethnic tension that will exist long after America and its allies withdraw and the Iraqi government gains momentum.

The insurgency, of all things, is a representation of the division that is to come. Regardless of military operations, Iraq has a long road ahead of it – a road that will in all likelihood be plagued by crony capitalism and corruption.

Roughly 60 percent of the Iraqi citizenry is part of the Shiite majority. If this majority places its own interests before the national interest, elections don’t mean a thing.

We’ve observed this scourge to democracy in the Caribbean, in Africa, and even in the U.S. ruling class, as they use their sway to award their comrades with benefits, contracts and favorable legislation.

Sunni and Kurdish Iraqis will suffer from oppression and watch their voice in government go virtually unnoticed. An elitist class will maintain control over oil revenues, assuring their own wealth while the typical Iraqi sees no economic development.

After all, the United States once viewed Sadaam Hussein as a stabilizing figure in the region.

His despotic tendencies assured the unification of a country that consisted of various incompatible groups, while his secular views (in relation to most Middle Eastern leaders) were considered desirable.

Now there is no totalitarian body to hold Iraq together and prevent extremism. There is only a fledgling government and the strong probability that it will soon be unable to truly serve Iraq’s national interest.

Of course this might not happen. Enough mainstream Iraqis might respect the integrity of their democracy enough to uphold its principles faithfully. A middle class that understands and respects order while remaining honest and well-intentioned might rise and take control.

But if they don’t, power struggles between groups that refuse to respect one another’s right to civic participation could lead to a series of violent coups – or even worse, a government that fashions itself as a democracy but fails to act like one.

Even in the United States, where the average American is satisfied to the point of indifference, these trends once prevailed.

If Iraq is going to become a beacon for democracy in the Middle East, its people will need to put aside their differences and first and foremost honor their new governmental system. A failure to do so will cause much more damage than any car bomb ever could.

Reisinger is a sophomore print journalism major and a copy editor of The Spectator.